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One of the key issues in the context of the UK’s EU referendum is the eﬀect a Brexit would have on
the country’s economy. Iain Begg assesses the economic claims that have been made so far in the
campaign, noting that there have been misleading ﬁgures put forward by both sides of the debate.
Two recent assessments of the economics of Brexit, from the Treasury and a new group calling
itself Economists for Brexit, come to diametrically opposed conclusions. They add to an array of
claims and counter-claims, many of which come up with apparently ﬁrm predictions, but have subtle
diﬀerences that make direct comparisons diﬃcult. Voters are entitled to be confused and to wonder
whether anyone can be believed.
The Treasury study can be interpreted as representing the government standpoint. George Osborne, the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, quoting from the lengthy analysis by his oﬃcials of the likely long-term impact of leaving the EU,
tells us that the average household would be worse oﬀ by £4,300. The ﬁgure is the mid-point of a range of estimates
based, in turn, on three diﬀerent scenarios about how the UK’s trade relationship with the EU would evolve after a
Brexit. The underlying projection is that GDP would be 6.2 percent lower and the headline ﬁgure is obtained by
dividing that GDP loss by the number of households.
The Chancellor is ﬂatly contradicted by the new group who argue that ‘Brexit will result in a better economic
outcome than remaining in the EU’. They do not provide the same sort of precise ﬁgure as the Chancellor, but one of
its members, Patrick Minford, refers in the new document to a previous analysis published in 2015 in which he and
his co-authors ‘identiﬁed 3.2-3.7 percent of GDP in ongoing costs’ of continuing membership of the EU. They also
point to potentially very dramatic longer term negative eﬀects on UK GDP, resulting from what they portray as the
looming threat of unfunded pension commitments in many core EU countries.
To understand how such diﬀerent answers can be
arrived at for ostensibly the same question, it is
important to look both at the methodologies employed
and the nature of the assertions made. It is routine for
economists to use sophisticated models to generate
projections of future developments in the economy.
Typically, these models rely on a range of
assumptions about what would happen in the
absence of whatever change is under discussion.
This ‘counterfactual’ is then used as the benchmark
against which to assess how the change will aﬀect
the economy.
In the Treasury exercise, the main focus is on how
trade enhances GDP and they use a technique often
used by applied economists for this purpose – the
‘gravity’ model – which starts from the empirically
well-founded proposition that trade will be more
intense between countries geographically close to one another. Key assumptions are that the UK maintains its
access to non-EU markets, but has diminished access to the EU, that there is a reduction of foreign direct
investment into the UK and that there is a diminution of competitive pressures which results in slower UK
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productivity growth. These can be considered reasonable assumptions.
The three scenarios examined by the Treasury are:
what has become known as the Norway/EEA model, despite it having been rejected by the Prime Minister, in
which the UK largely retains access to the European single market
the bilateral trade model in which a trade deal between the UK and remainder of the EU is negotiated, as is
the case today for the EU with Turkey and with Canada
the WTO model in which the UK has the same access to the EU market as other members of the World Trade
Organization, one consequence would be tariﬀs on some UK exports
According to the Treasury projections, UK GDP would be lower than it would otherwise be by 2030 under all of these
scenarios, but least under the ﬁrst model and most in the WTO variant. In each case they present a range, reﬂecting
diﬀering assumptions about the intensity of the eﬀects on key outcomes, such as on productivity. In all cases,
because GDP is lower, there is a negative eﬀect on tax revenue which means that the public ﬁnances deteriorate by
much more than the gain from the UK no longer having to pay towards the EU budget.
The approach of the eight ‘Brexeconomists’ is to assess a range of eﬀects on UK economic prospects, including
regulation, the trade regime, immigration, the position of the City of London and the public ﬁnances. The part of their
analysis which is most directly comparable with the Treasury projections is in a chapter which uses the University of
Liverpool ‘rational expectations’ model to assess the eﬀects of Brexit. Such models assume that economic actors
adapt quickly to the new environment and, as a consequence, can rapidly exploit new opportunities. Key
assumptions are that prices fall, beneﬁting consumers, there is a windfall gain from lower regulation and there is an
immediate gain to the public ﬁnances from no longer having to contribute to the EU budget.
Questions also arise about the numbers being quoted and how they are ‘spun’. In the Treasury projections, the
headline ﬁgure of a loss of £4,300 is criticised for being ‘per household’, when it is not a measure of household
income and for implying (though it was never actually said) that people will be worse-oﬀ. It is more common to refer
to GDP per head of population, but despite what some critics have argued – see, for example, Andrew Neil’s
entertaining interrogation of a Minister – there is nothing intrinsically wrong with using households. Clearly, though,
the latter results in a higher headline ﬁgure for the simple arithmetical reason that the aggregate loss is divided by a
smaller number: the equivalent ﬁgure for GDP per capita is £1,800.
Because the ‘loss’ projected by the Treasury is relative to what would have happened and GDP would be expected
to rise by perhaps 2 percent per year, taking it to 30 percent higher by 2030, the eﬀect of Brexit would be to lower it
to 27 percent higher in the best case and just 20 percent higher in the worst case.
Similarly, the 4 percent gain projected by the Economists for Brexit would mean boosting GDP growth to 34 percent
by 2030. However, the economists provide only limited evidence to back their claims, some of which rely more on
assertion than on hard data. For example, while recognising that there could be threats to London’s pre-eminence
in ﬁnancial services, they quickly dismiss them even though the City itself has repeatedly stressed the risks. The
report also states that the deregulation that will follow a Brexit is modelled as ‘a fall in the employer rate of national
insurance by 2%’. Even if is accepted that some forms of regulations will change, there is no explanation for why it
should be worth this amount.
In summary, both reports are only as good as the assumptions they make and the real question voters should ask
themselves is ‘are these assumptions credible’. Those of the Treasury are at least broadly in line with many other
assessments; those of the ‘Brexeconomists’ will raise more eyebrows. Even so, the Chancellor’s highlighting of a
loss of £4,300 is misleadingly precise.
The opening sentence of the Economists for Brexit paper states that ‘a lot of economic nonsense has been talked
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so far in the Brexit debate’. Indeed; but the bad news is that much more will follow before June 23.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: A version of this article originally appeared at UK in a Changing Europe. The article gives the views of
the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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